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OF ADVOCATES, DRUNKS AND OTHER PLAYERS:  
PLAIN TALES FROM AUSTRALIA

 
 
The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG

 
 
OF ADVOCATES 
 
When I retired from judicial office after 34 years service (13 of them as a 
Justice of the High Court of Australia), I was richly rewarded for my labours 
by the practising Bar.  Here in England, Inner Temple did me the honour of 
electing me a Bencher.  I was proud to follow Peter Taylor to that office.  In 
Australia, the Australian Bar Association, the Law Council of Australia and 
the governing body of my home Bar, the New South Wales Bar Association, 
conferred on me honorary life memberships.  I say this not to boast but to 
illustrate the forgiving qualities of barristers for the assaults that judges inflict 
on them during service in the courts.   
I inherited the post as President in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
the busiest full-time appellate court in Australia, from judges of high talent 
but sharp tongues who made appearing before them an often fearsome and 
stomach-churning experience.
1
  Like Lord Taylor of Gosforth, in whose 
honour this lecture is established, I came into the inner circle of the Bench and 
Bar from the outside.  I could never take pleasure in the discomfitures of 
barristers, where such conduct could redound to the disadvantage of their 
clients‟ arguments.  Yet in my case, there was a still recent reason why the 
Bar might have held a grudge against me.   
Traditionally, by the common law, a barrister in England and Australia, 
was immune from a suit in negligence, brought by a client, in respect of the 
barrister‟s professional performance in court.  So much had been upheld by 
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the High Court of Australia in 1988 in its decision in Giannarelli v Wraith.
2
  
In 2005, the principle in that case was questioned when a client brought 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria against both his barrister and 
solicitor claiming that their conduct had been lacking in the exercise of 
reasonable skill, care and diligence, so as to render them each liable, in 
contract and tort, for monetary damages to the client. 
The case, D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid,3 took a very long time to 
present its important questions of legal authority, principle and policy to the 
nation‟s final court.  Ryan D‟Orta-Ekenaike had been charged in February 
1996 with rape.  In July of that year, following legal advice, he pleaded guilty.  
However, on arraignment, he changed his plea and stood trial in the County 
Court of Victoria.  At that trial, his plea of guilty was led in evidence and the 
accused was found guilty by the jury and sentenced to three years‟ 
imprisonment.  He applied to the Court of Appeal of Victoria for leave to 
appeal against his conviction.  That Court held that the instructions given by 
the trial judge on the use that the jury could make of the guilty plea were 
inadequate.  The conviction was quashed and a new trial was directed.  At the 
second trial, the judge ruled that the guilty plea at committal was inadmissible 
in the circumstances.  The jury found the accused not guilty and he was 
discharged. 
It was then that Mr. D‟Orta-Ekenaike brought his civil proceedings in the 
County Court of Victoria against Victoria Legal Aid (VLA), which had acted 
as his solicitor, and against the barrister who had appeared for him at the 
committal proceedings and in his first trial.  The pleadings alleged negligence, 
it being contended that both the barrister and the briefing officer of VLA had 
negligently advised him that he did not have a defence to the charge of rape; 
that if he pleaded guilty at the committal he would receive a suspended 
sentence; and that, if he did not plead guilty there, he would be convicted and 
would receive a custodial sentence.  This advice was said to have been given 
out of court, at a conference in chambers two days before the commencement 
of the committal hearing.  The advice was repeated on the day the hearing 
began, resulting in the guilty plea.  Neither the solicitor nor the barrister had 
warned the accused that, if he pleaded guilty and subsequently sought to 
reverse that plea, it could be relied on by the prosecutor in the trial as an 
admission of guilt.  The client relied on strong evidence that he was exposed 
to undue pressure and influence designed to induce him to plead guilty.   
Based on the legal principle of immunity from liability in respect of the 
allegations of negligence, invoked by the lawyers, the trial judge in the 
County Court (Judge Wodak) permanently stayed the civil damages 
proceedings.  He held that both VLA and the barrister were immune from 
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legal liability.  On this occasion, the Court of Appeal of Victoria refused leave 
to appeal from the trial judge‟s decision.  An application for special leave to 
appeal to the High Court of Australia was referred to be decided, as on the 
return of an appeal, by the Full Court of that Court.  This is where I became 
acquainted in the travails of Mr. D‟Orta-Ekenaike.   
The majority of the High Court of Australia (Chief Justice Gleeson and 
Justices McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon) rejected the 
appeal.  They held that a legal practitioner, whether acting as an advocate or 
as a solicitor instructing an advocate, who gave advice leading to a decision at 
trial which affected the conduct of the trial, could not be sued in negligence 
on that account.  Specifically, the majority affirmed that there were powerful 
reasons for the Court to refuse to re-open its decision in Giannarelli.   
A factor relevant to that decision for four of the Justices (Chief Justice 
Gleeson and Justices Gummow, Hayne and Heydon in joint reasons) was that 
the Victorian Parliament had not proceeded to abolish the immunity enjoyed 
by barristers and solicitors, following the 1988 decision in Giannarelli.  The 
same Justices concluded that the advocate‟s immunity from suit resulted from 
the needs of the courts to provide finality to contests and to reinforce the 
central principle of the judicial system that controversies, once resolved, were 
not to be re-opened by collateral attack, except in a very few, narrowly 
defined, circumstances.   
The same members of the Court concluded that there were analogous 
instances where a wrong might occur but without a remedy, including, for 
example, the immunity from suit enjoyed by judges in respect of their 
performance of curial functions.  They held that, to permit negligence suits, 
would be to allow a second court to impugn the final decision of an earlier 
court, or to permit the re-litigation of matters earlier finally determined.  The 
also rejected an argument that a provision of the Legal Profession Practice 
Act 1958 (Vic) that stated that: 
 
“Every barrister shall be liable for negligence as a barrister to the 
client on whose behalf he has been employed to the same extent as a 
solicitor was on [a date in 1881]” 
 
cured any defects of the common law and indicated a legislative intention to 
establish actionable liability in barristers. 
I alone dissented from all of these holdings.  The result was a triumph for 
the principle of the immunity of the Bar in Australia, indeed, an extension of 
that immunity so that it would apply to solicitors as well.  It applied to 
conduct out of court, as well as to conduct under the special pressures of in-
court advocacy.  Champagne corks were heard popping in Phillip Street, 
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Sydney and William Street, Melbourne where many barristers are housed, on 
the news of the High Court‟s decision in March 2005. 
In the argument of the D’Orta-Ekenaike case, the High Court of Australia 
had before it the then recent decision of the House of Lords in Arthur J S Hall 
& Co v Simmons.
4
  In that appeal, the House of Lords identified a number of 
developments in legal practice which, they concluded, justified a 
reconsideration, and ultimately abolition, of the immunity for advocates from 
suit.  The issues in the Australian case were broader and more complicated, 
because of the proceedings against the solicitor at the VLA, a statutory 
authority, and because of the history of 19
th
 century attempts in Victoria to 
amalgamate barristers and solicitors and to provide for equal liability in 
negligence.  Still, there were common issues in the two proceedings. 
The House of Lords was never formally part of the Australian judicature.  
Even Privy Council appeals had been terminated by the Australia Act 1986 
(Aust and UK).  Thus, their Lordships‟ decision in Arthur JS Hall did not 
bind the Australian courts.  Nevertheless, great respect is shown throughout 
the Commonwealth to decisions of final national courts.  A recent decision on 
a similar point in England was clearly the stimulus for undertaking the review 
of the Australian ruling in Giannarelli.  It was the source of the major 
arguments of legal principle and policy advanced by the appellant in the 
Australian case.  In particular, he latched on to the conclusion stated by Lord 
Steyn in Arthur JS Hall:  
 
“[O]n the information now available and developments since Rondel v 
Worsley,
5
 I am satisfied that in today‟s world that decision no longer 
correctly reflects public policy.” 6 
 
Whilst sweeping away the old immunity, as a relic of an exclusion from 
the rules applying to virtually all other professionals, some of the Law Lords 
in their speeches drew a distinction between collateral attacks on final 
judgments in civil and in criminal cases.
7
  Unanimously, the High Court of 
Australia was unconvinced that such a differentiation was conceptually viable.   
In my reasons, I was required to deal with the peculiar history of the 
common law rule in Victoria and the foregoing special statutory provision.  A 
dark hint in argument that the Law Lords in Arthur J S Hall had been forced 
to come to their conclusions because of the super-imposition upon the 
otherwise admirable reasoning of earlier English courts of alien concepts 
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7
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contained in the European Convention of Human Rights.
8
  In fact, no mention 
at all had been made an argument of that instrument, a gap that I attributed to 
the non-application of the incorporating provisions of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) at the time relevant to the proceedings in the Arthur JS Hall case.  
Yet most of my reasons were addressed to the so-called public policy 
arguments deployed by the majority in the Australian decision to claim the 
continuance, indeed expansion, of the immunity in Australia.   
Amongst other considerations, I referred to the expansion of the number 
of lawyers engaged in advocacy today (many of whom are not now 
barristers).  And the conceptual difficulty of providing the immunity for 
supposed reasons of instantaneous judgement within court rooms, yet denying 
it to the decisions expected of a surgeon or of a pilot of a large passenger 
aircraft.
9
  The fact that the High Court, far from cutting back on the 
exceptional immunity, was pushing it into new and unhistorical applications, 
merely demonstrated for me the lack of convincing reasons behind the Court‟s 
proposed ruling.  I am not, of course, questioning that ruling as it states the 
law of Australia.  I am explaining why I could not join in it.   
An undercurrent in the majority approach was a fear of floods of 
litigation, brought by discontented litigants against lawyers, which could not 
easily be repelled.  However, I sought to respond to that fear: 
 
“It does not happen in the United States, a most litigious country, 
where there has never been an immunity from suit for attorney 
advocates.
10
  It does not happen in Canada, where the courts have 
rejected such a general immunity.
11
  Instead, in that country, the courts 
have concentrated on developing special rules to recognise the 
practical problem that lawyers often face in conducting trials and 
giving legal advice.  The general unavailability of legal aid in 
Australia to support negligence claims against lawyers; the availability 
of summary relief against vexatious claims;
12
 and the rules against 
abuse of process by re-litigation
13
 (not to mention the empathy and 
understanding of judges for co-professionals in unmeritorious cases) 
                                                     
8
  (2005) 223 CLR 1 at 99 [315]. 
9
  223 CLR 1 at 101 [322]. 
10
  Ferri v Ackerman 444 US 193 (1979).  See Arthur JS Hall [2002] 1 AC 615 at 721, 
per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
11
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make it completely unnecessary to retain an absolute immunity of the 
broad, even growing, ambit propounded in this case.” 14 
 
In these remarks, I invoked the comment of Lord Hoffmann in Arthur JS 
Hall: 
 
“[The immunity] is burning down the house to roast the pig; using a 
broad-spectrum remedy where a more specific remedy without side 
effects can handle the problem equally well.”15 
 
To demonstrate the truth of Lord Hoffmann‟s dictum, I was also able to 
invoke the experience of litigation in Australia between the time that the trial 
judge had found the immunity unavailable to barristers in Victoria in 
Giannarelli, before that immunity was restored on appeal.  There was no 
objective evidence of any increase in the length of criminal trials in that 
interval
16
.  Similarly, in respect of the experience of England, I had available 
to me a report on what had happened following the Arthur JS Hall decision.
17
  
Only a handful of cases involving alleged negligence on the part of barristers 
had reportedly come to the courts.  In only two of them was the barrister 
found liable at law.  This led the commentator to conclude that the Arthur JS 
Hall decision: 
 
“... does not appear to have caused any great problems for the legal 
profession.  Indeed, the reaction of some in the profession is that it is 
to be welcomed, if it helps to restore public confidence in the 
openness and accountability of the profession.” 18 
 
To the argument of Justice Michael McHugh that the imposition of civil 
liability upon barristers would be “intolerable”, I suggested that this could not 
be a governing criterion, and was not so in the case of neurosurgeons, airline 
pilots or others who make extremely difficult and instantaneous professional 
decisions but were responsible in law for fleeting acts and omissions of 
carelessness.
19
  As to the appeal to the “undeniable public interest in the 
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  223 CLR 1 at 103 [328]. 
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  [2002] 1 AC 615 at 703. 
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  Law Reform Commission of Victoria Access to the Law: Accountability of the 
Legal Profession (Report No 48, 1992) pp 35-36 [78]. 
17
  J Senevieratne “The Rise and Fall of Advocates‟ Immunity” (2001) Legal Studies 
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maintenance of the independent Bar”,20 I pointed out that such a Bar existed, 
and would continue to exist.  To suggest that in Australia, uniquely, the Bar 
would be destroyed by removing an anomalous out of court immunity for 
lawyers portrayed a lack of proper confidence in the survival capacity of the 
highly talented advocates found at the Australian Bar.  Australian barristers, 
and their instructing solicitors, I urged, were “made of sterner stuff.”21  
To the suggestion that the reforms should be left to Parliament, I invoked 
Lord Steyn‟s conclusion in Arthur JS Hall that judges had created the 
immunity and judges should say that the grounds for maintaining it no longer 
existed.
22
  The final reason for rejecting an enlargement of the immunity was 
that it amounted to according an anomalous, unjust and unclear exemption 
from legal liability to a particular class of citizens.  In a modern and 
egalitarian society, if that were to be done, it had to be done with the express 
authority of Parliament.  An extension of liability by judges was particularly 
unacceptable. 
Whilst my reasons on this issue stood alone and unloved in the Australian 
courts, it was a tiny consolation to me to observe, soon after, that the New 
Zealand courts,
23
 in a similar challenge, preferred my approach to that of the 
majority of the High Court of Australia.  The writing is on the wall for 
advocates‟ immunities.  It is far from impossible to imagine that even the 
immunity of judges for instances of deliberate abuse of office or of grossly 
negligent decisions may need to be re-visited:  not necessarily to burden the 
judges individually to recompense those who have suffered thereby, but to 
provide remedies for judicial decisions that are shown not to have been made 
bona fide and in the discharge of the judicial office.
24
   
 
OF DRUNKS 
 
If judges, barristers and solicitors are, on the whole, pillars of society and 
generally admired, or at least respected, for their learning, honesty and 
diligence in often stressful situations, the same qualities are not usually 
attributed to people who get intoxicated, and whilst intoxicated, suffer serious 
harm, even death.   
This is particularly so in the case of injecting drug users, as witness the 
great difficulty experienced in societies in persuading law makers to introduce 
schemes of sterile needle exchange, so as to reduce the spread of HIV and 
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AIDS.  Despite the overwhelming evidence that such schemes radically 
reduce the levels of the virus in this cohort of the population, that reflects its 
general composition, getting sensible policies and reflecting those policies in 
law, is extremely difficult.
25
 
Even with intoxication caused by alcohol (a drug that is freely available 
(at least to adults), generally socially accepted and heavily advertised), an 
antipathy creeps into legal decisions, involving tort and statute law, so as to 
deny rights of recovery to the intoxicated where their condition is, in part at 
least, the result of conduct on the part of alcohol providers.  This fact was 
demonstrated in 2004 in a decision of the High Court of Australia on 
negligence liability, reached shortly before my retirement from the Court.  
The case was Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd.
26
   
On this occasion, the majority of the Court (Chief Justice Gleeson and 
Justices Gummow, Hayne and Callinan) concluded that, if the alcohol 
provider owed a duty of care, such duty had been discharged by what its 
employees had done in that case.  Two Justices (Chief Justice Gleeson and 
Justice Callinan) held that the provider did not owe a general duty to take 
reasonable care to protect patrons against the risk of physical injury from 
consuming alcohol.  Justice McHugh and I dissented.  We concluded that 
there was a duty of care in the circumstances; that it had been breached; and 
that the breach caused the damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
As is usual in cases of negligence litigation, whether involving 
professional negligence or otherwise, a detailed appreciation of the facts is 
essential to distinguish between those cases where a plaintiff succeeds and 
those where she fails. 
Tweed Heads is a pleasant seaside holiday resort town in New South 
Wales, just south of the Queensland border.  On a Sunday in June 1994, its 
rugby league football club offered a champagne (actually Spumante) breakfast 
free-of-charge to all comers.  Mrs Cole attended and proceeded to drink large 
quantities of the available sparkling wine.  Like other patrons, she moved 
from time to time between the drinking area and a vantage point where she 
could watch football games on the adjacent field.  Her drinking continued 
well into the afternoon.  Although by 12.30pm, Mrs Cole was clearly 
intoxicated, she was still sold a bottle of wine, and was variously described as 
                                                     
25
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“very joyous and happy” or “an embarrassment, totally inebriated.”27  By 
3.00pm, the wife of the manager of the club refused to sell her more alcohol 
because of her state of insobriety.  Still, she remained on the premises, and in 
the company of friends who, inferentially, were providing more alcohol to 
her.   
At about 5.30pm in the afternoon, the club manager asked Mrs Cole to 
leave on account of her drunken and indecent behaviour.  He offered her use 
of the club‟s courtesy bus or to call a taxi to take her home.  She rejected these 
offers.  Soon after, she left the club on foot in the company of two men, with 
one of whom the indecent public behaviour had occurred.  At 6.20pm, Mrs 
Cole suffered very serious injuries when she was run down by a motor vehicle 
on a public road near the club.  She sued the driver of the vehicle and the club, 
claiming negligence. 
At trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the trial judge found 
against both defendants but concluded that there was contributory negligence 
on Mrs Cole‟s part.  He apportioned liability:  30% to each of the defendants 
and 40% to Mrs Cole.  The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld 
appeals, set aside the judgment and dismissed Mrs Cole‟s action.28  Special 
leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was granted by Chief Justice 
Gleeson and me.  However, the High Court, by majority, rejected the appeal. 
Once again, the case was a little complicated by the intervention of 
statutory law.  By the Registered Clubs Act 1976 (NSW), s 44A, it is an 
offence for a person in a registered club (like that at Tweed Heads) to supply 
liquor to an intoxicated person.  It was not argued that this criminal provision, 
of itself, gave rise to a civil cause of action.  But it was contended that the 
common law duty in negligence would mould itself to the stated 
parliamentary obligation.  This view was rejected by a majority of the High 
Court in what I suggested was a “withered view of community and legal 
neighbourhood propounded by” them.29   
In my opinion, the statutory provisions “shed light on the problems 
presented to the common law because they make plain the purpose of 
Parliament that intoxicated persons are not to be sold, or supplied with, 
alcohol on ... club premises.”30  Yet his had happened at 12.30pm when the 
evidence showed that Mrs Cole was already seriously affected by the free 
alcohol supplied to her earlier in the day.  The object of the common and 
statutory law was to prevent things coming to the inebriated circumstances 
that could lead to tragic outcomes, as they often do and as they did to Mrs 
Cole after 6.00pm.   
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The majority of the High Court of Australia was understandably 
concerned to avoid imposing nanny-like duties on an alcohol outlet that would 
substitute for the freewill of the patrons, like Mrs Cole.  This was obviously a 
proper concern.  But expert evidence in the case, supported by commonsense 
and ordinary experience, showed the need for some firmness of action at an 
early, rather than later, stage in the deterioration of Mrs Cole‟s inhibitions and 
self-control.  One can understand the conclusions reached by the majority.  
However, it was my view that a higher standard was imposed by the law for 
all the Mrs Coles of this world, given the role that a national final court plays 
in expressing the common law requirements of neighbourliness:   
 
“The law of tort exists not only to provide remedies for injured 
persons where that is fair and reasonable and consonant with legal 
principle.  It also exists to set standards in society, to regulate wholly 
self-interested conduct and, so far as the law of negligence is 
concerned, to require the individual to act carefully in relation to a 
person who is in law a neighbour
31
.  The club had a commercial 
interest to supply alcohol to its members and their guests, including 
[Mrs Cole].  Doing so tended to attract them to an early-morning 
breakfast, to induce them to use profitable gambling facilities in the 
club‟s premises and to encourage them to use the restaurant and other 
outlets where alcohol would continue to be purchased or supplied to 
the profit of the club ... [T]he common law has long recognised that 
the occupier of premises owes a duty to take reasonable care for the 
safety of those who enter the premises.  That duty arises from the 
occupation of premises.  It extends to protection from injury from all 
of the activities of the premises, including, in registered premises such 
as the club‟s, the sale of alcoholic drinks.” 32 
 
Justice McHugh reached a similar conclusion.  However, our opinions did 
not carry the day.  Our references to standards that had been applied in earlier 
decisions in analogous cases in Australia and overseas were to no avail.  
Justice McHugh concluded his opinion with these words: 
 
“No doubt some minds may instinctively recoil at the idea that the 
Club should be liable for injuries sustained by a drunken patron who is 
run down after leaving its premises.  But once it is seen that the Club 
has a legal duty to prevent her drinking herself into a state where she 
was liable to suffer injury, the case wears a different complexion.  The 
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Club has a legal responsibility for the injury.  Instinct must give way 
to the logic of the common law.”33 
 
The factors that weighed on my mind were similar.  According to the 
majority‟s analysis, there was no sanction upon the provider of alcohol to 
prevent or discourage it from plying a patron with alcohol (including free 
Spumante over several hours) and then taking only formal steps to provide for 
her return to her residence of safety.  There was no reinforcement of the 
parliamentary will to prohibit the licensee supplying further alcohol to the 
intoxicated.  Nothing was effectively done to diminish conduct that would 
reduce a decent citizen to public acts of indecency and personal gross 
inebriation.  Truly, the law washed its hands of responsibility.  It was my view 
that judges in a final court, at least, had to consider whether this was the 
standard of the law for the society they lived in.  However, Mrs Cole lost her 
case. 
A second case arose soon after my retirement from judicial office where 
the decision in Cole was applied in equally troubling circumstances:  CAL No 
14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board.
34
  In that case, a widow 
instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Tasmania.  She claimed 
damages as a result of the death of her husband, consequent upon injuries 
sustained by him when his motor cycle collided with a bridge whilst he was 
driving home.  The claim alleged negligence on the part of the proprietor and 
licensee of a hotel in Triabunna, a township in beautiful Tasmania.  The 
evidence at trial showed that the deceased arrived at the hotel at 5.00pm.  He 
began drinking beer and then spirits.  When a rumour circulated that a police 
breathalyser and speed camera had been set up nearby, it was suggested to 
him (and he agreed) that he put the motor cycle in a locked store and collect it 
the next day.  The licensee eventually did this and placed the keys to the 
motor cycle in the petty cash tin, out of reach of the deceased.  This was the 
normal receptacle for keys handed over by customers.   
The deceased then stayed on the premises for an additional hour drinking 
and gambling.  He left the premises between 7.45pm and 8.15pm.  However, 
he soon returned demanding access to the motor cycle.  The licensee offered 
to telephone his wife; but was rebuked:  “If I want you to ring my fuckin‟ 
wife, I‟d fuckin‟ ask you”.  The licensee alleged that he had asked the 
deceased three times whether he was fit to drive.  Being assured that he was, 
he provided the keys to the plant room and unlocked it.  The fatal accident 
took place at around 8.30pm.   
The trial judge (Justice Blow) rejected the claim of negligence.  However, 
this decision was reversed by a majority of the Full Court of the Supreme 
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Court of Tasmania.
35
  By special leave, an appeal was brought to the High 
Court of Australia.  Justice McHugh and I having departed, that Court 
unanimously set aside the orders on appeal.  It restored the order of the trial 
judge, dismissing the action.  Specifically, the High Court concluded that the 
licensee did not owe any duties to the deceased to telephone his wife, in the 
circumstances disclosed, so that she could come and collect her husband.  
Alternatively, the majority of the judges concluded that, if there were any 
such duty to telephone the deceased‟s wife, the evidence did not support a 
conclusion that the accident would have been prevented by the hotelier‟s 
having done so. 
To some extent, the case in Tasmania was weaker than Mrs Cole‟s case.  
The period of drinking and the degree of intoxication appears, on the 
evidence, to have been less prolonged and extreme.  On the other hand, the 
significant (and certainly atypical) step by which the deceased had 
surrendered the keys of his motor cycle and consented to it being locked 
away, at least arguably, strengthened the claim of the widow.  Why would this 
course have been suggested, still more why would it have been agreed to, if 
there was not already a significant and obvious problem of intoxication 
recognised and accepted by supplier and patron alike?   
Having suggested, and agreed to, such precautions, was it a proper 
discharge of the duty of care to the deceased to hand over the keys and unlock 
the store simply because the patron demanded this course with a few ripe 
expletives?  Was not the very act of self-deprivation in the control of the 
motor cycle enough to alert the licensee to the particular risk that the alcohol 
he was supplying can sometimes bring?  This includes a diminution of the 
subject‟s self-perception and capacity of self-control by reason of the very 
product which the alcohol provider has a profit motive to keep supplying to 
the patron?   
Arguably, against that potential conflict of interest and duty, the 
communal sense of neighbourliness, reflected in the law of negligence, 
requires intervention by courts to set a social standard that alcohol providers 
will comply with (and can themselves blame and plead in excuse) before 
letting loose an intoxicated patron on the public roads.  Clearly, doing this 
involves a danger to the patron, but also to others, and to the community 
generally.  Here, it involved a distinct danger to the patron‟s family who 
suffered the loss of a breadwinner in consequence of the turning over the keys 
and unlocking the store, contrary to the very precaution that the patron and 
licensee had earlier agreed to. 
These comments do not, of course, alter the current state of the law in 
Australia.  That law is as stated by the High Court in Cole and in CAL No 14.  
But in today‟s world, we do not live only in our own jurisdictions.  Through 
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the internet, CommLII, AustLII, BailII and that marvellous series The Law 
Reports of the Commonwealth,
36
 all judges, and especially judges of final 
national courts, have daily access to contemporaneous decisions on analogous 
problems decided in other English-speaking Commonwealth countries.   
In Canada, in 1974, in Jordan House Limited v Menow,
37
 a patron was 
ejected from a hotel where he had been served with beer from the late 
afternoon and evening until 10.00pm.  When he was then struck by a vehicle 
whilst walking home and sustained serious injuries, he sued and recovered 
damages at trial, affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Such 
damages were apportioned equally as between the plaintiff, the motor vehicle 
driver and the hotel.  The Supreme Court of Canada rejected a further appeal.  
The Justices concluded that a duty of care existed in the circumstances; and 
that it was enlivened, on the evidence, by the manifest intoxication of the 
plaintiff.   
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1995 in 
Stewart v Pettie.
38
  That was a case where a passenger was seriously injured 
when a car, driven by her brother, crashed after the brother had been 
continuously served alcohol by the outlet where he had been drinking 
throughout the evening.  The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that a duty 
of care existed on the part of alcohol-serving establishments towards their 
patrons because the latter were sometimes rendered unable to look after 
themselves once they become intoxicated.  Furthermore, the provider owed a 
duty not only to the patron but also to third parties who might be dependent 
on his skill as a driver.  Commercial vendors of alcohol were held 
“unquestionably” to owe a general duty of care to persons who could be 
expected to use the highways.  Injury to a passenger of the patron was 
therefore foreseeable.   
The Canadian court explained that the reluctance of courts to impose 
affirmative duties on persons for a failure to take positive action had been 
tempered where a “special relationship” existed between the parties that 
resulted in the imposition of a positive duty.  The Court reached the policy 
conclusion that such a “special relationship” existed at the least between the 
vendors of alcohol and the motoring public.  That duty was enlivened in the 
given case because nothing had been done to prevent or inhibit the driver.  He 
was simply let loose to drive his vehicle, to the danger of his passengers, 
including his sister, and other members of the public.  Against this danger, a 
higher standard of the common law of negligence applied.   
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A review of the cases in England
39
 and Australia,
40
 before the decisions in 
Cole and CAL No 14 shows a large preponderance of decisions upholding 
claims of negligence against alcohol outlets that continued to provide their 
product to patrons, to the point of intoxication and beyond, where they are 
known to be exposed to risks on the public highway.  However, in Australia, 
following the two recent decisions of the High Court, such authorities have 
been rendered dubious and it would certainly be very risky to place reliance 
on them.  In Australia, it seems, drinking alcohol is to be left to private 
assessment and responsibility despite that product‟s inhibiting features of self-
knowledge and willpower.  No encouragement is to be given by the common 
law of negligence to self-control on the part of the outlet or customer and 
control by the employees.  Freewill reigns.   
Is this a desirable result from a social point of view?  This is a question 
that inevitably final courts must ask themselves.  Perhaps it was my early 
years attending Methodist churches in Sydney, and there imbibing the culture 
of community responsibility for its vulnerable members, that made me 
approach such matters with a heightened sense of the law‟s duty to uphold 
community standards and neighbourly duties.   
A barrister or solicitor who can never be sued for conduct associated with 
advice to a client can substantially banish from his or her thinking the 
sanction of an unpleasant action even for egregious wrongs or the need to 
explain his conduct in an open court as well as to a public liability insurer.  
An alcohol outlet which is permitted, without legal sanction, to ply a 
vulnerable middle-aged woman with alcohol over six hours, or a motor cycle 
driver expressly recognised to need protection, over three hours, is removed 
from the irksome stimulus that civil liability at law can sometimes exert.  
Representatives of alcohol outlets then have little or no encouragement from 
the law to introduce rules of good practice controlling the amount of alcohol 
they serve to patrons over time; and the precautions (including perhaps 
notification to police) that they should observe, even where doing this might 
damage their commercial interests which are to turn a blind eye and to wash 
their hands of „other peoples‟ problems‟. 
 
OTHER PLAYERS 
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The great difficulty with the influential speech of Lord Atkin in Donoghue 
v Stevenson
41
 was that it attempted to offer broad principles to guide 
negligence liability in a vast range of factual circumstances, in the place of the 
earlier categorisations of causes of action by reference to factual peculiarities.  
Every judge and every law student knows the famous passage I refer to.  It 
may be Delphic and even circular, as its critics suggest.  But it is seeking to 
express a broad principle based, ultimately, on notions of community ethics:   
 
“[I]n English law there must be and is some general conception of 
relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases 
found in the books are but instances.  The liability for negligence, 
whether you style it as such or treat it as in other systems as a species 
of “culpa”, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.  But acts or omissions 
which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be 
treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand 
relief.  In this way, rules of law arise which limit the range of 
complainants and the extent of their remedy.  The rule that you are to 
love your neighbour becomes in law:  You must not injure your 
neighbour, and the lawyer‟s questions:  Who is my neighbour? 
receives a restricted reply.  You must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to 
injure your neighbour.  Who then, in law, is my neighbour?  The 
answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected 
by my act that I ought reasonably to have had them in contemplation 
as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or 
omissions which are called in question.”42 
 
At the very end of his speech, Lord Atkin went on to say, in words that are 
rarely quoted: 
 
“[This] is a proposition that I venture to say no-one in Scotland or 
England who is not a lawyer would for one moment doubt.  It will be 
an advantage to make it clear that the law in this matter, as in most 
others, is in accordance with sound commonsense.”43 
 
So if the facts are overwhelmingly influential in the outcome of cases of 
negligence at common law, and if the scope of liability depends on a kind of 
moral equation, the obvious need in society is to cut the Gordian knot that is 
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presented by Lord Atkin‟s notion of close and direct affectation that 
reasonably engages the mind of those whose acts and omissions can otherwise 
cause harm to others, because they are closely and directly affected by the 
decisions that need to be made. 
In Australia, for some time, a test of “legal proximity” was adopted to 
control the finding of whether a duty of care in law should be upheld or 
denied
44
.  By the time I was appointed to the High Court of Australia, this 
theory of “proximity”, although still “in use”, was undergoing critical 
reappraisal, in England, Australia and elsewhere.  In England, Lord Oliver 
had thrown cold water on the notion in Caparo PLC v Dickman.
45
  In 
Australia, this fact eventually encouraged its abandonment in Sullivan v 
Moody.
46
  This was because a majority of the High Court of Australia had, by 
that stage, been assembled which considered that “proximity” was too open-
ended; that the imperial march of negligence had to be reversed; that costs of 
insurance were becoming excessive; and that plaintiffs‟ claims needed to be 
contained and rejected.   
In a series of decisions in the High Court of Australia,
47
 seeing the writing 
on the wall of these developments, I urged that the way to tame the tort of 
negligence – and to control its suggested excesses – was to adopt the three-
stage test for finding a duty of care expressed by Lord Bridge of Harwich in 
Caparo.
48
  This, in turn, was somewhat similar to an incremental approach 
earlier suggested by Justice Brennan in the High Court of Australia.  It 
requires examination of:  
 
(1) Whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the alleged tortfeaser that the 
particular conduct or omission would be likely to cause harm to a person such 
as the claimant;  
 
(2) Whether between that tortfeaser and the claimant, a relationship existed 
that would be characterised as one of proximity or neighbourhood; and  
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(3) If so, whether it was fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a 
duty of a given scope upon that tortfeaser for the benefit of that person?
49
   
 
At the least, I hoped that this approach would provide a control over 
idiosyncratic narrowing of liability in negligence and oblige judges 
(especially in the final court) to address candidly the issues of public policy 
enlivened in every case by the third question.  Thus, in the cases I have 
examined, the public policy of imposing (or exempting from) liability for the 
provision of legal advice by advocates (alone of all professionals) and the 
public policy of effectively exempting alcohol providers from accepting and 
safeguarding patrons (some of whom will be extremely vulnerable) from the 
very consequences that the provision of alcohol for profit will occasionally 
cause is central.   
My quest ultimately came to nothing.  It was finally rejected in Australia 
in Sullivan v Moody.
50
 As more and more plaintiffs failed in proceedings in 
the High Court of Australia, I called attention to the pulling up of the 
drawbridge from the tradition of community responsibility and 
neighbourliness.  And the substitution of a “shift of legal policy, albeit one 
that is not usually spelt out and justified by judges as the Caparo approach 
would require.” 
In the place of “proximity”, or the Caparo enquiry into fairness, justice 
and reasonableness, the Australian law appears to have embraced a broad 
touchstone of “reasonableness” in determining when a duty of care will be 
imposed.
51
  In my last years in the High Court, I accepted the duty “for the 
time being” to conform to the majority opinion.52  However, I confessed that I 
did so with without enthusiasm or a conviction that a generalised search 
amongst the “salient features” of the facts of each case was a sensible 
substitute for a more principled, conceptual and candid approach to charting 
the metes and bounds of negligence liability. 
In coming to this conclusion, I was influenced not so much by the 
Methodists of my youth as by my service in my middle years in institutional 
law reform.  There, as Lord Scarman had taught, the role of lawyers was, at 
least partly, to forsake the pragmatic problem-solving, minimalist approaches 
of the common law – stumbling from one decision to the next.  Instead, it was 
to try to perceive each new problem in the context of the broad canvas of the 
law.  And always to ask how the answer to the particular case would advance 
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desirable outcomes, not only for the parties, but for the community generally 
that must live with the judicial resolution of the parties‟ litigious conflict.   
All of which is to say little more than what that earlier judicial 
conceptualist, Lord Atkin, had remarked in Donoghue v Stevenson.  That each 
particular case must always be seen in our law as an instance of a broader 
genus.  That judges of final courts have an extra duty to search for, and 
express, the broader principles that should guide later and lower courts and 
ordinary citizens and their lawyers, as surely as statutes do.  And that, in the 
end, they should test their conclusions by the intuitive responses about the 
content of law that would be held by non-lawyer citizens applying sound 
commonsense to legal outcomes.
53
 
If this approach is followed in the two instances I have studied by 
reference to plain tales from Australia, I do not myself doubt the outcome that 
should be adopted.  Exceptional immunities from liability in negligence 
would be denied to, still less expanded for, lawyer advocates and their 
solicitors.  And effective immunity would equally be denied to alcohol outlets 
sheltering behind notions of freewill as they sell their product that has the 
inevitable effect of diminishing the very willpower in the consumers said to 
justify self responsibility.  The outcomes of each case would necessarily 
depend on the facts and circumstances accepted at trial.  The removal of 
accountability in negligence is intuitively wrong.  It is contrary to the 
neighbourhood principle as Lord Atkin expounded it.   
To the extent that the law concludes otherwise, it needs re-examination.  
And in the cyclical way of these things, such re-examination will one day 
come.  Lord Taylor‟s life journeyed marvellously on the cycle and he rose to 
become the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales.  Too soon, he died.  
Those who are still on the journey have the responsibility to search for 
principle and justice; and to make sure, if possible, that these two great forces 
of the law coincide. 
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